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This is anOpAbstract – This article analyzes co-regulation as a policy instrument that makes it possible to achieve
synergy between public support and private efforts in the food sector to improve the nutritional quality of the
food offer. Our objective is to demonstrate the interest and the limits, as well as the conditions of the
efﬁciency of this instrument, through the empirical analysis of the French voluntary agreements for
nutritional improvements (charters) implemented in the framework of the French National Nutrition and
Health Program (PNNS). We propose an interpretative model of the policy action on the nutritional quality
of the food offer set out in the PNNS and we carry out new indicators of success to assess the efﬁciency of
voluntary agreements in the food sector.
Keywords: voluntary agreements / nutrition policy / co-regulation / voluntary commitments / nutrition quality
Résumé – Efﬁcience de la co-régulation publique-privée dans le secteur de l’alimentation : les
accords volontaires français pour l’amélioration nutritionnelle.Cet article analyse la co-régulationen tant
qu’instrument politique permettant de réaliser une synergie entre les initiatives publiques et les efforts privés
dans le secteur alimentaire pour améliorer la qualité nutritionnelle de l’offre alimentaire. Notre objectif est de
démontrer l’intérêt et les limites, ainsi que les conditions d’efﬁcience de cet instrument, à travers l’analyse
empirique des accords volontaires français d’amélioration nutritionnelle (chartes)mis enplace dans le cadre du
ProgrammeNationalNutrition et Santé. (PNNS). Nous proposons unmodèle interprétatif de l’action politique
sur la qualité nutritionnelle de l’offre alimentaire déﬁnie dans le PNNS et nous présentons de nouveaux
indicateurs de succès pour évaluer l’efﬁcience des accords volontaires dans le secteur alimentaire.
Mots clés : accords volontaires / politique nutritionnelle / co-régulation / engagements volontaires / qualité
nutritionnelle1 Introduction
In industrialized countries, the imbalance between overly
abundant dietary intake and the energy requirements of the
population actively contributes to the determinism of non-
communicable chronic pathologies1 that are one of the major
public health issues today (Hercberg and Tallec, 2000). Among
these diseases, obesity and overweight are on the rise inion to the Topical Issue “Lipids and Health / Lipides et
egories: I18, D22
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le, cancer, cardio-vascular disease, osteoporosis, obesity,
y itself is also one of the determining factors in the
t of some diseases such as cardiovascular pathologies,
etes, some cancers of the digestive system, etc.
en Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative CommonsA
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any mindustrialized countries as well as throughout the world, even if
obesity andmalnutrition co-exist in many developing countries.
When analyzing debates on anti-obesity policies, two main
approaches, corresponding to two possible action levers, can
be identiﬁed (Kersh and Morone, 2005; Kersh, 2009):
targeting individuals and their behavior (eating habits, type
of exercise they do) and/or targeting the environment (foods
proposed, available exercise opportunities, urban planning,
etc). Actions on the food demand and offer can be classiﬁed,
respectively, according to these two levers.
Public and private sector efforts were traditionally
concentrated on information policy (Golan and Unnevehr,
2008), assuming that the problem lies in consumer behavior
and, therefore, the necessity to inform them about their choices
(Kersh and Morone, 2005). However, an alternative vision of
the problem gradually arose as a result of the development of
diseases linked to diet: “many dietary choices are predeter-
mined or inﬂuenced by market forces that are beyond thettribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
2 The SYSPAHMM is a foresight method particularly suitable for
research which allows traceability, uses mathematical processing and
gives the possibility to test the “regularity” of our work. SYSPAHMM
method comprises several stages: ﬁrst it produces a static graphic
description of the study system, second identiﬁes processes and state
variables, next transforms the most important processes into
hypotheses, after that establishes a matrix of inﬂuences of each
hypothesis on the others, then breaks down these hypotheses into
clusters of hypotheses that are more closely linked together, ﬁnally
builds microscenario families based on relationships between
hypothesis within the cluster and constructs macroscenarios. In this
paper, we mobilized the second stage of the foresight SYSPAHMM
method in handling primary and secondary data to identify short
sentences called “process” in order to describe what happens and what
actors do. We complete this dynamic description with state variables
that allow us to quantify processes at work.
C. Sebillotte : OCL 2019, 26, 34control of individual consumers” (Golan and Unnevehr, 2008).
As of that time, it became obvious that the problem no longer
depended on consumer decisions alone, but on the nutritional
environment as well. “The underlying notion is that choices
must be made, but the environment affects the content of
choice.” (Brownell et al., 2010).
In the last decades, food industry practices have been
criticized as have been their products for contributing to a poor
diet, leading to overweight and obesity (Kersh and Morone,
2002; Nestle, 2002; Brownell and Horgen, 2004; Ludwig and
Nestle, 2008). In many countries, in recent years, we have seen
the emergence of public initiatives aimed at modifying the
nutritional quality of the offer, targeting product characteristics
and sales outlets, marketing actions and advertising (Jourdain-
Menninger and Lignot-Leloup, 2003). Some ﬁrms have
implemented self-regulating policies to improve nutritional
quality, these approaches are limited and their results are often
mixed (Sharma et al., 2010). Some authors consider that the
solution to chronic illnesses linked to diet partially lies in
innovation in the food industry and would thus encourage
partnerships between the private and public sectors (Yach
et al., 2010). Voluntary agreements (VAs) are an example of
these partnerships.
What are the underlying factors of the VAs performance to
improve food offer nutritional quality? What indicators of
success could be adequate to assess the efﬁciency of this kind
of co-regulation in the food sector?
Our aim is to show the interest and the limits, as well as the
conditions of the efﬁciency of VAs in the food sector, through
empirical analysis of the French VAs for food nutritional
quality improvements (hereafter referred to as charters). This
policy device based on VAs, which we call the charter device,
was launched by the French government in 2007 within the
framework of the French National Nutrition and Health
Program established in 2001.
This policy action is too often judged on the sole criterion
of the number of agreements signed, so we established
performance indicators to build our own evaluation of the
device and of the charter approach. Our analysis deals with two
key dimensions of the modiﬁcation of the offer by voluntary
commitments: the intrinsic quality of the commitments and the
part of the overall offer covered by the signed agreements. It
raises an essential question in terms of VAs concerning the
food offer: should the policies attempt to minimally improve a
large part of the offer or, instead, try to obtain a radical
improvement that may only involve a small part of it, hoping
that the rest of the offer will follow as a result of competition
(on nutritional characteristics) between the economic actors?
In other words, how can we reconcile the requirement for
nutritional quality level improvement imposed on the
economic actors with the adhesion commitment level?
After dedicating section 2 to materials and methods, we
describe the theoretical background and the practical context
of our question in section 3. In section 4, we propose an
interpretative model of the policy action on the food offer
nutritional quality set out in the PNNS, we focus on the French
charter device and the way it operates and we analyze the
proﬁle of the signed charters. Then, we propose new indicators
to assess the efﬁciency of VAs in the food sector. Before
drawing the conclusions, we identify the limits of this policy
action on the offer, we discuss the charter dilemma, dealingPage 2 dwith requirements and adhesion level, and ﬁnally put forward
charter device reasoning in terms of dynamic trajectory.
2 Materials and methods
Our longitudinal qualitative analysis (Pettigrew, 1990) is
based on the interview method (Romelaer, 2005; Kvale and
Brinkmann, 2009), the analysis of documents and note-taking
in the ﬁeld. We studied the empirical cases of six economic
operators (EOs) who had signed the voluntary charters:
Nestlé, Paul, Casino, Bleu-Blanc-Cœur, Unijus and Fiac-
Adepale Fruit Section. Additionally, we interviewed repre-
sentatives of individual ﬁrms or groups of ﬁrms, who signed
(Danone, Unilever, Bongrain, Fict...) or did not sign (Edenred,
Franprix-Leader Price) charters as well as public actors
(people in charge of PNNS, ministry ofﬁcials, scientiﬁc
researchers, scholars...).
We analyzed two types of data obtained between 2007 and
2012. The ﬁrst type concerns primary data gathered from (i)
thirty 2–3 hour interviews, recorded and transcribed, with
actors mandated by the government who participated in these
nutritional policy actions, public and private food and nutrition
experts, actors from industry, the mass market sector,
professional and syndicated food associations, etc.; and (ii)
public presentations, working group meetings in which we
participated (mainly within the Lipids’ group managed by the
Ministry of Agriculture), informal discussions, etc. The second
type deals with secondary data taken from written sources
(particularly the texts of agreements that were signed and made
public, as well as private and public documents, news articles
and research papers) and audiovisual documents (presenta-
tions, interviews conducted by third parties). We crisscross
these different documents in order to identify processes and
state variables according to the SYSPAHMM method2
(Sebillotte and Sebillotte, 2002, 2010). These processes and
state variables, that can be assimilated to the “meaning units”
produced by the coding methods (Allard-Poesi, 2011; Ayache
and Dumez, 2011), are organized into groups or categories;
each process or state variable can belong to more than one
category. They are inventoried into a database for organizing,
comparing and ranking such as “ways of conceptualizing data
that then generated new insights (...) for further exploration”
(Rossman and Rallis, 1998). Following Rossman and Rallise 15
C. Sebillotte : OCL 2019, 26, 34(1998) “writing about qualitative data cannot be separated
from the analytic process”. Therefore we integrated the
intermediary ﬁndings progressively into the subsequent
versions of the monographic texts; these texts allowed us to
supply longitudinal study (Forgues and Vandangeon-Derumez,
2007) and formalize progressively our interpretation of the
French model for policy action on the food offer.
3 Theoretical background and practical
context
3.1 Public intervention on the food offer: a promising
avenue for public health
Scientiﬁc studies concerning policy interventions, aimed at
creating an environment favorable to physical activity and
healthy diet, present promising results (Basdevant et al., 2006).
Among these studies, some focus on modiﬁcations of food
composition in order to modify the nutritional quality of the
offer, and on their impacts in terms of public health.
At the end of the 1990s, some scientiﬁc studies had already
shown the positive effects of modifying the quality of the offer
on public health (Swinburn et al., 1999). More recent studies
have revealed the beneﬁcial effects of public and private
strategies leading to modiﬁcations of the composition of foods
in order to improve the quality of the offer. These analyses are
particularly focused on the decrease of salt content (Girgis
et al., 2003; Thomson, 2009) and trans fatty acids (Saunders
et al., 2008; Unnevehr and Jagmanaite, 2008; L’Abbe et al.,
2009; Ratnayake et al., 2009; Ricciuto et al., 2009) and the
increase in ﬁber content (Mancino et al., 2008).
Combris et al. (2011) simulated the effects in France of an
improvement in the content of the major macronutrients in
some food categories. They observed a wide variability of
nutritional quality within each food category. Moreover, it
appeared that products with lower nutritional quality would
lead to large modiﬁcations in the quantity of nutrients on the
market and, as a result, to changes in the level of nutrients
consumed by individuals. The simulations produced by this
study suggest potential positive effects in terms of public
health of an intervention on the offer based on the
reformulation of the content of several macronutrients, which
would not signiﬁcantly affect taste or production costs.3.2 Co-regulation for modifying the food offer
Three ways to regulate the food offer found in the literature
aim at directly improving the nutritional quality of foods by
modifying their composition. They include direct regulation or
“command and control regulation” (Girgis et al., 2003; Eckel
et al., 2007; Unnevehr and Jagmanaite, 2008), self-regulation
(Seiders and Petty, 2004; Lang, 2006; Hawkes, 2007;
Pomeranz and Brownell, 2008; Harris et al., 2009; Pomeranz
et al., 2009; Stanley and Daube, 2009; Wilde, 2009; Sharma
et al., 2010) and co-regulation between public and private
actors (Sebillotte, 2016). Within a co-regulation approach, the
government gives ﬁrms the right to play a legitimate role in the
improvement of public health. At the same time, the
government, through its supervisory structure, gives itself the
right to guide and control ﬁrms’ actions when they attempt toPage 3 dsolve social problems. This makes it possible to reconcile the
mobilization of economic operators (EOs) relevant knowledge
with compliance with public rules. VAs belong to this latter
category.
3.3 Voluntary agreements: the efﬁciency of dynamic
and interactive policy process
Starting from 1970s, in France, Lascoumes et al. (1989)
identiﬁe a large number of VAs but it is in the mid 1980s that
the voluntary approaches ﬂourish in environmental manage-
ment and regulation (Grolleau et al., 2004). Less explored than
other public regulation instruments, the voluntary approaches
in the ﬁeld of environment were studied from economic
perspective (David, 2004; Grolleau et al., 2004; Mzoughi,
2005) and also from the point of view of management sciences
(Aggeri, 1998, 1999), sociology (Lascoumes et al., 1989;
Lascoumes, 1994) and legal sciences (Hervé-Fournereau,
2008). Under varied labels, like branch agreement, branch
program, anti-pollution sector plan, etc., these regulation
instruments cover diverse realities (Highley et al., 2001;
Grolleau et al., 2004). And beyond that diversity, three
common criteria are displayed by the majority of voluntary
approaches (Grolleau et al., 2004; Hervé-Fournereau, 2008):
the voluntary engagement character of regulated entity; the
objective to improve the environment performance goes
beyond reglementary conformity; the improvement of the
economic efﬁciency allows “achieving a social goal at the
lowest cost or with attractive private beneﬁts” (Grolleau et al.,
2004). The deﬁnitional characteristics of VAs put forward by
authors such as Aggeri (1999) are:e–1“the preeminence of a horizontal cooperative process in
which ﬁrms are partners”;– “the signing of a contract (convention, charter, VA, etc.)
ratifying the agreement between the two parties and
describing their reciprocal commitments”;– “a monitoring process involving various resources (norms,
instruments, essays, reports, etc.)” (Aggeri, 1999).Even if European Commission considers that not all VAs
implemented were successful, it encouraged their implemen-
tation (EC, 1996, 2002) while suggesting some actions to
improve their efﬁciency and effectiveness: prior consultation
with the parties involved and formalization of technical and
administrative conditions of VAs (formal contract, quantitative
targets according with a predeﬁned schedule, obligation of
each part must be laid down, monitoring modalities, regular
publication and public availability of the outcomes) (EC,
1996).
The debates on the environmental VAs efﬁciency lie in: the
ambition level and the socially satisfying character of the
collective targets; the question of compliance given their non-
mandatory status; their cost-efﬁciency, compared to other
possible policy instruments (economic instruments and direct
regulation) (Glachant, 1995). The economic analysis of the
VAs focuses on the intense phase of negotiation between the
authorities and ﬁrms, at the end of which the collective VAs are
signed. In some cases, high demand for time and resources that
negotiation requires from stakeholders is seen as a source of
inefﬁciency for VAs (Coglianese, 2001; Grolleau et al., 2004).5
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knowledge and ii) insufﬁciently dissuasive means to sanction,
the authorities can negotiate the technical solutions cost
disclosure and their implementation with private actors. From
that viewpoint, the VAs are considered a default solution which
can put the authorities at risk of regulatory capture by the
private interest to the detriment of the public interest. By
contrast, according to Aggeri (1999) in the “situations of great
uncertainty, involving long periods of time and involving the
wide range of actors”, when neither the public authorities nor
ﬁrms have enough knowledge and means to solve issues, the
regulatory process cannot be considered as “the result of
pressure and negotiations between deﬁned actors or interest
groups with clearly deﬁned strategies” (Aggeri, 1999). If we
consider the speciﬁc nature of the addressed problem, its
complexity and its temporality and take into account learning
and innovation processes in which many involved stakeholders
are concerned by the public policy objectives (Aggeri, 1999),
the conditions for the efﬁciency of VAs change and,
consequently, the way in which they are evaluated.
For example, the efﬁciency of a VA cannot be evaluated in
the same way as if the solutions and/or their effects are known
to the operators, or as if the solutions are to be designed as part
of the VA and subsequently applied. If in the ﬁrst case the
evaluation of VAs can focus on the efﬁciency of the
negotiation, in the second case it is a question of evaluating
and coordinating processes spread over time, contributions to
the solution distributed between several actors and solutions
that still need to be tested in the ﬁeld.
Given i) the wide variety of products and processes that
characterize the food supply, ii) the diversity and the large
number of actors involved in food supply and demand, iii) the
uncertainties that characterize the process of political
intervention on food and nutritional issues (evolution of
nutritional knowledge, reactions of actors to policy actions,
attribution and distribution of responsibilities between the
actors concerned...) (Sebillotte, 2016), our analysis of the
PNNS VAs efﬁciency cannot be satisﬁed with the only static
interpretation of public policy and requires to consider public
action as a dynamic and interactive process. In this framework,
it would be more appropriate to speak of “procedural
efﬁciency” (Aggeri, 1999).
3.4 The French voluntary charter device3 for
nutritional improvement
In France, the possibility offered to EOs4 in the food
sector5 to sign VAswith the government, known as “charters of3 In this article, the word device translates the French term “dispositif”
that we use in the same meaning of Foucault’s thought (Foucault,
1977).
4 These EOs may be ﬁrms that produce, process or distribute food for
human consumption or feed for animals. The committee responsible
for drawing up the reference model used the deﬁnition of a food sector
ﬁrm given in EC regulation no. 178/2002.
5 Theymay belong to the agro-food industry, the retail sector, the mass
catering sector or the agricultural production sector. They may also be
a brand distributor or a professional or interprofessional organization
or association (EC regulation no. 178/2002).
Page 4 dvoluntary commitments for nutritional improvement”, is one
of the key actions launched in 2007 within the framework of
the PNNS (Box 1).e 1Box 1. French National Nutrition and Health Program
The French National Nutrition and Health Program
(PNNS) was implemented in December 2000. It is
coordinated by the Ministry of Health, in conjunction
with government authorities responsible for agriculture
and ﬁsheries, consumption, youth and sports, national
education and research. This policy acts simultaneously on
the food demand and on the food product offer. In its ﬁrst
phase, the PNNS (2001–2005) mainly focused on actions
concerning information, orientation and education of the
consumer in order to develop balanced dietary behavior
and adapted physical activity, and to produce consumer
recommendations, while the objectives concerning the
offer remained just words rather than being translated into
tangible actions. In the second phase, PNNS2 (2006–
2010), actions related to the demand continued (campaigns
to promote and disseminate nutritional recommendations
for consumers, nutritional education in schools, etc.),
whereas actions concerning the offer became effective,
particularly through the French collective and individual
voluntary charter device. Actions concerning the offer and
demand are continuing in the third and fourth phases,
PNNS3 (2011-2015) et PNNS4 (2017-2021) respectively.
For a description of the PNNS, the reader is referred to the
work of Hercberg et al. (2008).We present below the elements that make up the charter
device and its operation.
3.4.1 Reference guideline and a committee responsible
for charter validation
To lay the operational groundwork for this action, an
expert committee was empowered by the government to
draw up a reference guideline capable of helping operators
in the food sector to establish charters. This guideline also
proposes orientations on possible means to be used for
veriﬁcation, validation and information about these commit-
ments. A charter validation committee was constituted to
examine and approve charter proposals on behalf of the
government.
The reference guideline stipulates that these charters can be
assigned to only one EO (individual charter) or to a collective
EO (collective charter).
3.4.2 Charters for nutritional improvement
The aim of these charters is to improve the diets of the
population in general, including disadvantaged populations.
They therefore focus on the objectives deﬁned by the PNNS
for the population as a whole, on the consumption of salt and
simple sugars, total lipids, saturated fatty acids, complex
carbohydrates and ﬁbers, and fruits and vegetables. The
approach is progressive in that it is the effort that counts and
not the level reached. Commitments concern both nutritional
composition and portions recommended for consumption. The5
Table 1. Areas and sub-areas of intervention for PNNS charters.
Intervention area Intervention sub-area
Nutritional composition of existing products Nutritional characteristics, particularly modiﬁcations in the formulation aimed
at reducing the content of salt, simple added sugar and total lipids
Formulations other than those mentioned above
Drawing up menus
Creating alternative products Development of alternative products
Product consumption (frequency, quantity,
target population)
Reduction of serving size
Increase in the consumption of fruits and vegetables
Organization of sales outlets
Development of communication and information at sales outlets and outside
of sales outlets
Marketing, advertising and sales promotion
“Complementary” areas External actions
Internal actions
Source: MAAP, MINEFI, MS 2007.
C. Sebillotte : OCL 2019, 26, 34reference guideline recognizes four possible areas of inter-
vention (Tab. 1).
These areas are not prioritized. Nevertheless, if there is no
commitment in terms of nutritional composition, the applicant
must give reasons for this. The validation of a charter is
conditional on its signiﬁcance, i.e., “that it covers a sufﬁcient
share of the applicant ﬁrm’s products or a sufﬁciently large
share of the profession represented by the organization that
proposes the charter”6 7. Nutritional improvements that are the
subject of commitments “must not affect the accessibility of
products, particularly by an excessive increase in their prices”
(MAAP et al., 2007). After discussion of each charter
application, the validation committee issues its opinion on
the proposed charter and decides whether or not to accept it. If
the charter is not accepted, a letter will include the reasons and
suggest the necessary modiﬁcations to be carried out by the
applicant to submit once again.
As an incentive to commit, the government gives approved
ﬁrms the possibility ofmaking their commitment to a “nutritional
improvement approachencouragedby the government”known to
the public, according to a very precise procedure.
3.4.3 Controlling compliance with commitments
Commitment objectives must be precise, measurable,
dated and controllable. The signatory to the charter must
transmit the results of the annual assessment of his
commitments to the validation committee and to the Food6 In general, at least two-thirds – in volume, in turnover or in
promotional expenses – of the products, or two-thirds of the members
in the case of a professional or interprofessional organization (MAAP
et al., 2007).
7 Two other conditions can be added to this condition for
admissibility. One concerns the presentation of the charter in
compliance with the pre-established reference guideline. The other
deals with the establishment of a calendar with the dates when
commitments will be completed.
Page 5 dQuality Observatory (Oqali). A charter can be modiﬁed at the
request of the signatory economic actors or of the government.
This ﬂexibility and the absence of sanctions in the case of non-
compliance with the commitments do not mean absence of
control. The control indicators of each commitment, the means
of veriﬁcation of compliance with commitments as well as
independent third parties responsible for carrying out this
control are proposed by the EOs to the charter validation
committee. Independent third parties are paid by signatory
EOs, except for Oqali which is free of charge.
3.4.4 Monitoring the impacts on offer quality by the Food
Quality Observatory
The government uses Oqali to monitor the global
implementation of commitments and to assess their impact on
the global food offer. This observatory was established in 2008
by the Ministries of Agriculture, Health and Consumption, and
its implementationwas entrusted to theFrenchNational Institute
for Agricultural Research (INRA) and French Agency for Food
Safety (AFSSA)8, in partnership with professionals and
consumer associations. For a description of the Oqali, the
reader is referred to the work of Menard et al. (2011).
3.4.5 Thematic working groups
The charter device is completed by thematic (e.g.
carbohydrates, lipids, salt) working groups that bring together
a wide range of collective actors and partners (representatives of
producers, manufacturers, retailers, mass catering actors,
consumers, AFSSA, INRA, government agencies, etc.),
coordinated by the Directorate General for Food of the French
Ministry of Agriculture. Their aim is to contribute, through this
collective endeavor, to building a reﬂection platform to develop
charters,mainly collective, by theEOs.Theirmissions included:8AFSSA became French Agency for Food Environmental and
Occupational Health Safety (ANSES) in 2010.
e 15
Fig. 1. Our interpretation of the French model for policy action on the nutritional quality of the food offer. Notes: EOs = economic operators.
C. Sebillotte : OCL 2019, 26, 34establishing an accurate overview based on existing data in
order to create a common knowledge base that is shared by
all the participants; determining the range of possibilities for
making nutritional improvements, given that the economic
actors are subjected into speciﬁc constraints (technological,
regulatory, organoleptic, economic, etc.); and identifying
concrete actions to be implemented, particularly in the form
of collective charters. For instance, the lipids group created
in 2007 aimed at bringing together all the concerned actors
who could examine food offer improvement possibilities
with regard to lipids, sector by sector, and in line with the
PNNS. On that account, the group has identiﬁed some
improvement measures for lipid composition and food offer
modalities (such as portion size, consumer product
information, etc.) in all sectors. The group also analyzed
these measures from the point of view of nutritional interest
and anticipated its impact on food consumption and eating
behaviors.
4 Results and discussion
4.1 Our interpretation of the French model for policy
action on the food offer
According to our interpretation after analysis of the texts,
interviews and ofﬁcial speeches, the model for policy action on
the nutritional quality of the food offer (Fig. 1) designed by the
French government is based on the following three general
assumptions:–9 These authors show the importance of knowledge in theconsumers will not substantially transform their food
choices in view of an improvement in their diets.Despite
the measures implemented concerning the demand, their
commitment is insufﬁcient and remains so even if they are
aware of nutritional recommendations;development of a regulation based on the deﬁnition of an “operational–
theory” of the regulation.EOs will not spontaneously make nutritional impro-
vements on the global offer in general and withoutPage 6 de 1affecting the accessibility of improved products.
Self-regulation may be hindered by the fear of losing
market shares. In fact, modiﬁcations implemented may
alter the organoleptic quality and/or the costs of products,
leading to price increases or the decrease in margins
(Golan and Unnevehr, 2008). The public authorities
consider that in order to improve the nutritional quality
of the standard offer, in a general way and without
changing its price (so that accessibility is not reduced),
they most actively intervene to promote the participation
of EOs;– the government does not massively intervene in the
markets: neither with an economic policy of taxing or
subsidizing certain products; nor with a technical policy
that would ﬁx the standards that could perceptibly modify
the characteristics of products on the markets (in terms of
prices, organoleptic characteristics and nomenclature). The
food sector is characterized by a wide diversity of products
and processes. The government has neither sufﬁcient
knowledge to assess the possibilities of the evolution of
companies (Aggeri et al., 1995)9 nor the means necessary
to regulate and administer in these areas by classic
instruments. It runs the risk of establishing measures that
are unrealistic and, as a result, not followed (Barde, 1992).
The government also expresses its intention of maintaining
the variability of the food offer.On the basis of these three assumptions and according to
our interpretation, the French government designed an action
model whose target is the nutritional improvement of the offer
by means of voluntary commitments to nutritional improve-5
C. Sebillotte : OCL 2019, 26, 34ments, particularly collective ones. We propose a stylized
representation of this model (Fig. 1):
– a framework and rules established by the government.
The purpose of this framework is to encourage EOs
(individually but especially collectively) to make commit-
ments on nutritional improvements formalized by the
signature of the VAs with the government. In addition, the
government determines the rules with regard to the EOs: (i)
by providing a structure for their actions in the form of a
reference guideline to be adhered to; and (ii) by
determining the acceptable level of effort proposed,
without establishing it beforehand, but rather through
the acceptance or rejection of commitment proposals made
by the EOs;– follow-up of the impacts from private efforts on the
nutritional quality of the offer. This involves highlighting
(i) the efforts of each signatory and their contribution to the
improvement of the quality of the global offer, as well as ii)
the impact of the overall charter device on the improvement
of the offer. The aim of highlighting the impacts of private
efforts is to create an emulation mechanism between ﬁrms;– an incentive in terms of image for participating ﬁrms. In
order to make the charter device more attractive, the
government gives ﬁrms the possibility of making their
commitment known to the public. They can therefore use
their efforts towards nutritional improvement to boost their
image. On the other hand, no coercive measure will be
levied in the event of non-compliance with the commit-
ments. The government did not ofﬁcially formulate the
threat of a future regulation. Nevertheless, the nutritional
tax is always present, even in the background, in reﬂections
and debates about nutritional policies. The contributions on
drinks containing added sugars and on energy drinks, took
effect in 2012 and 2013 respectively, served as a precedent
that makes the tacit tax threat more credible;– a common representation of stakes built by andwith the
concerned actors that allows the government to reduce
its uncertainties. Finally, this model integrates forums of
cross exchanges and learning (Hatchuel, 1994) between
representatives of professional organizations, partners
concerned by questions of nutrition and the government
(e.g. voluntary thematic working groups, validation
committee). Through these forums, the government
provides itself with the means for its own learning process
on nutrition-related issues. This knowledge could therefore
be mobilized by the government in the future, to readjust
the charter device over time, as well as to establish other
means of intervention than those based on voluntary
actions alone.10Only one of the distributors, Casino, is commited in a distributor
capacity, but only for an annual event for the “fruit and vegetable”
department and for in-store nutritional balance awareness actions.
11 Infant nutrition diversiﬁcation products.4.2 Proﬁle and characteristics of PNNS charters
signed within the device
From February 2007 to the end of 2012, that is, some six
years after they were launched, 30 charters have been signed
(MS and MES, 2012). Among the 30 charters, we can
distinguish 26 individual charters, 24 of which were signed by
manufacturers and two by distributors, plus four collective
charters.Page 7 dWe can observe a strong predominance of individual
compared to collective charters. The majority of the ﬁrms
committed individually are involved in processing. The same
is true for collective charters. The two distributors committed
individually did so primarily as processors10, i.e., for the
manufacturing of their retailer brands. In general, the
agricultural production link is almost absent among the
signatories. Retailers are poorly represented in terms of their
core activity. This situation suggests that, because of this, the
key to nutritional innovation in foods is in the processing link,
and that contributions made at other levels of the sector do not
appear to be decisive.
Among the individual charters, 11 were signed by major
groups for one or several of their brands or ﬁrms (e.g., Danone
for Tailleﬁne, Nestlé for Herta, Maggi, Cereal Partners France
and Produits de nutrition infantile11 in four different charters).
Fifteen individual charters were signed by independent,
generally large ﬁrms. Small and medium-sized ﬁrms were
virtually absent. Within the signatories of four collective
charters, three professional unions and a French non-proﬁt
association can be distinguished.
Among the collective charters, that of the Fruit Section of
the Fiac-Adepale (processed fruits) was signed by ﬁrms that
belong to the same level of the sector: processing. As for the
charter signed by the Fict (cured meat products), in addition to
the processors, there are two distributors since they belong to
the union. Another situation is that of the Unijus (fruit juice)
charter. It was signed by a fraction of the professional
organization: fruit processors, packers, distributors and
importers. Brokers or suppliers of rawmaterials were excluded
because they would not play a major role in the evolution of
market products. In contrast, for the Bleu-Blanc-Cœur charter,
the signatory non-proﬁt association (whose mission is to
organize animal production that integrated nutritional
concerns) is counting on the involvement of all of the actors
of the food chain, from the linen producer to the ﬁnal
consumer. The four collective signatories all existed before the
charter was signed, i.e., the members of the collective did not
come together because they had the intention of presenting a
common charter. Negotiations between collective members to
arrive at a charter proposal were primarily focused on the level
of improvement but not on the means necessary to achieve it.
The member ﬁrms of the signatory collectives committed to
issues that they could address with knowledge that they already
possessed or that they were capable of producing themselves.
The charters did not encourage exchanges of knowledge
between ﬁrms, as was the case for the VAs in the automobile
sector concerning the environment (Aggeri et al., 1995).
Only four charters propose commitments in the four
eligible areas. All of the charters are committed to
improvements in the area of nutritional composition (Tab. 2).
The texts of the charters and interviews with the EOs reveal
that for some ﬁrms, nutritional improvement initiatives began
long before the PNNS2 through more or less formalized
actions. Companies like Unilever, Danone and Nestlé hade 15
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C. Sebillotte : OCL 2019, 26, 34already undertaken nutritional improvement measures and
created their own in-house nutritional quality reference
guidelines. For example, Unilever established a nutrition
enhancement program (NEP) (Nijman et al., 2006). For those
companies that were already “initiated” to nutrition improve-
ment, the charter device would only have strengthened or
perhaps even legitimized their approaches. For other ﬁrms, the
device may have played a role in triggering nutritional
improvements or by encouraging the systematization of
improvements carried out in an unsystemized way until then.
Some signatories link their nutritional improvement approa-
ches to environmental issues (e.g., Scamark) or to sustainable
development (e.g., Casino) or corporate social responsibility
approaches (e.g., McCain).
4.3 Which assessment for the efﬁciency of the
charter device?
Different studies were carried out by Oqali to assess the
direct impacts of the charters signed on the improvement of the
quality of the offer. According to these studies individual
efforts can be important but the impact of charters on the
average nutritional quality of supply and on the nutritional
intake of French consumers remains modest (Oqali, 2012,
2013). These results suggest an interest in the signiﬁcant
improvement of the composition of the offer.
External evaluation of PNNS2 was entrusted to the French
General Inspectorate of Social Affairs (IGAS) and to the
General Council on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas
(CGAAER). The voluntary commitment charters were
qualiﬁed by this mission as an important action. Nevertheless,
the results obtained were considered to be insufﬁcient. In terms
of the “methodology and the action philosophy”, the charter
device is considered to be a real innovation by the external
evaluation mission. However, the latter considers that “few
charters were signed” and that the device “did not live up to its
expectations” (Jourdain-Menninger et al., 2010).
Generally speaking, and beyond the external assessment,
most of the criticisms made of the device agree on the small
number of charters signed12. We come back to this point below
and provide our own proposal of success indicators for
assessment of the device, in a dynamic and interactive
perspective of the policy process.
4.3.1 Another perspective on the indicator “number of
charters signed”
At ﬁrst glance, 30 charters signed in six years seem a few.
In fact, the number of charters signed and the rate at which they
were signed cast doubts on the possibility of eventually
fulﬁlling the government’s aim that was to “reach a maximum
number of operators” (MS, 2006).
However, what are the reference number and the reference
period to consider it as “little”? What signiﬁcance should be
given to this indicator within an innovative and experimental12 For example, we can ﬁnd this criticism in the discussion of the
initiation of actions to improve the offer within the framework of the
French National Food Program (PNA), lauched by the Ministry of
Agriculture in 2010 (MAAP, 2011).
Page 9 ddevice based on voluntary participation? Is the number of
charters signed a relevant indicator for the assessment of the
device?
Our interviews revealed that the high level of standards
imposed and the means necessary to put together the
application package (very time- and labor-intensive and
requiring a high level of expertise) could have discouraged
certain economic actors from ﬁling an application, particularly
small and medium-sized companies that are poorly represented
in the device. Nevertheless, this low adherence cannot be
considered as an indicator of the lack of interest of EOs for the
device. For example, in June 2011, 27 charters were signed, but
the number of applications ﬁled at the time was 43, i.e., 40% of
the approaches proposed were not validated (and among those,
some ten were abandoned)13.
The ofﬁcial texts of the program do not specify either a
measurable objective or a formalized indicator for the
assessment of the charter device. The PNNS coordinators
interviewed in 2011 said that it is the general objective of the
program that should be evaluated.
4.3.2 Nutritional level of the commitments
Our analysis of the charters reveals that: the commitments
are substantial14; the improvements in composition cover all of
the eligible nutrients and the proposals meet the requirements
concerning the part of the offer covered by the charter. The
“proposal-negotiation-validation” process that leads to the
signature of a charter seems to have contributed to this result.
In this process, the point of departure, crystallized in the initial
application, consists of prior knowledge and the constraints of
the economic actors (e.g. technological, economic, organo-
leptic, sanitary). On the basis of this ﬁrst proposal, a
“personalized” negotiation takes place, with several back-
and-forth discussions possible between the validation commit-
tee and the EO. This process acts as a strong ﬁlter to ensure that
the commitments are accepted when they are signiﬁcant and
realistic. The possibility of proposing commitments “subject to
conditions” also encourages the EOs to propose more
ambitious commitments since they have the possibility of
modifying their content or the level of the initial objective in
the future if the motives to justify the change are valid. For
example, Orangina-Schweppes, faced with great uncertainty
about consumer preferences, is committed to improving the
composition of soft drinks without alcohol if the improved
products are validated by consumer tests. In this way, the
device has contributed to dissuading, ﬁltering or improving
poorer quality proposals. The validation committee has in fact
been criticized for pushing quality requirements to the extreme
by considering that certain proposals to improve composition
are insufﬁcient despite the fact that they concern large volumes
(Jourdain-Menninger et al., 2010). In the search for a
compromise between the level of nutritional quality of a
charter (assessed primarily on the basis of improvements in
product composition) and the global volumes concerned by13Data provided by one of the device’s coordinators.
14 In order to analyze the nutritional level of the commitments, we
particularly focused on improvements in the nutritional composition
of the products, which is, as we have already seen, the central aspect
of the charter device.
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Table 3. Impact of commitments made by the signatories at other levels of the production chain and in relation to other actors. Domino effect.
Functions of the production chain or actors concerned Type of impact
Distribution on processing Bid calls followed by speciﬁcations Awareness, information
Source of innovation for suppliers’ suppliers (forums)
Processing on distribution Commitments related to national brands have an effect on retailer brands
Processing and distribution on the production of raw materials Type of raw materials required and characteristics of fresh products
Processing on processing (processor supplier) On processed ingredients that are part of the ﬁnal product
Processing on the restaurant sector Nutritional improvement of the offer proposed to the restaurant sector
Processing and/or distribution on consumers, health
professionals, company employees, patients, journalists,
research
Information, training, education, medical advice.
C. Sebillotte : OCL 2019, 26, 34improvements, the strategy deliberately chosen by those
responsible for the implementation of the device was therefore
to give priority to quality aspects.
4.3.3 Accessibility of improved products
A study on the potential impact of charters on the French
population nutritional intake ﬁnds that ultimately all socio-
economic classes will beneﬁt from reformulations and that for
all nutrients, except for calcium (Oqali, 2012).
To our knowledge, there has been no quantitative
assessment of the impacts of nutritional improvements on
product price until now. Our analysis reveals that the
promised improvements are distributed across the product
range: within a charter, improvements are not reserved just
for the high end of the product range. We consider that the
inclusion of this criterion as one of the conditions for
eligibility of a charter was a determining factor for it to be
complied with by each EO. Moreover, we observed that a
very small minority of signatories explicitly commit
themselves to questions of price. Nevertheless, according
to the experts consulted, no price increase is linked to
nutritional improvements.
4.3.4 Fulﬁlling commitments
The commitments made by the EOs were fulﬁlled. The
cases where the initial objectives had to be modiﬁed by the
EOs with the agreement of the validation committee remain
exceptional and even anecdotal. This suggests that the
ﬂexibility provided by the agreements, e.g., in the form of
commitments “subject to condition”, can be used correctly and
judiciously by the economic actors. The very in-depth
assessment of the charters, their public and publicized
signature, and the availability of their content on an ofﬁcial
site are all factors that may have contributed to the fact that the
commitments were fulﬁlled. This compliance is even more
meaningful since no sanction was planned in the case of non-
compliance.15 Casino charter (Casino, 2008).4.3.5 Domino effects that are difﬁcult to assess
We observed that the commitments included in a charter,
whether individual or collective, have an impact on actors
other than the charter signatories. We call this the domino
effect whose nutritional, economic and social impact shouldPage 10not be neglected. Even if a charter is individual, it mobilizes
much more than just the signatory EO. In fact, signatories
make commitments that have repercussions on other levels of
the production chain and on other actors such as, for example,
suppliers of raw materials or processed products that
contribute to the composition of the ﬁnal product (Tab. 3).
A particular case is that of the retailer sector for the production
of its retailer brands. For example, the Casino group, signatory
of a charter, “works today with more than 450 food suppliers of
which some are small companies”15. This means of subcon-
tracting on the part of the retailer leads to a multiplier effect of
its own nutritional improvement commitments on the
manufacturers that produce the retailer brand products
concerned by these commitments. It goes hand-in-hand with
the role of innovation catalyzer played by the retailer in
relation to certain retailer brand suppliers, and particularly
small companies. The latter would perhaps not have
undertaken nutritional improvement measures if the retailer
had not integrated nutritional requirements into the selection
criteria of the responses to the bid offers. Finally, in addition to
the impacts of the charters on actors other than the signatories,
we can also mention real impacts on products developed by the
same signatories but not within the scope of the charter.
Indeed, for logistical reasons, the commitment to improve a
product can lead to improvements of other products of the
signatory ﬁrm for which no commitment was made.
According to this analysis, to assess the impact of charters,
it would ﬁrst be necessary to situate the charter device in its
context in order to deﬁne the limits of the system concerned by
the impact of improvements.
4.3.6 Temporality
How much time is considered reasonable to “reach a
maximum number of operators”? Analysis of the charter
device reveals a particularly long time frame and a slow time
step for the nutritional improvement of the offer. One of the
speciﬁcities of contractual policies is the integration of a time
dimension (Lascoumes et al., 1989). Time is a factor in the
preparation of charters, negotiations prior to their validation, in
the ﬂexibility that could make it possible to take some
variables (price, consumer reactions) into account, in the
progress of nutritional improvements, in the research process
that underlies innovation, in the idea of emulation betweende 15
16 Statement made by a major group, very much involved in the
healthy image of its products, which signed a charter.
C. Sebillotte : OCL 2019, 26, 34ﬁrms, in the changes of consumers’ preferences, etc. The
mobilization of a contractual and voluntary policy instrument
attempts to integrate the approach into a long-term strategy.
4.3.7 An ambitious device but out of phase with the
urgency of expectations
The lack of experience and the low availability of research
on VAs in the area of nutrition may explain why criticism has
focused on the number of agreements signed, as if they were
considered within the measures of classical regulation. Taking
into account the speciﬁcities of contractual policies, our
extended approach considers other aspects and highlights new
impacts of the device, some of which are difﬁcult to measure.
Our interpretation of the charter approach reveals a device
which is demanding, in terms of nutritional performance of
each commitment, and responsive to questions of accessibility
of products targeted by a charter. According to our analysis, the
committed actors keep their promises. In addition, this device
has effects on other products and other actors rather than those
directly concerned by the VAs. It is supposed to contribute to
the control of diseases linked to diet, however, given the urgent
nature of the problem, its adhesion rate can be considered as
too slow. The charter device would therefore address the
seriousness of the problem but not its urgency. Admittedly, the
device has been integrated into a long-term strategy.
4.4 What were the limits of the charter policy action
model on the offer?
What were the limits of the model for policy action on the
offer set out in the PNNS?Why a model designed to lead to the
signature of a large number of collective commitments
produced individual agreements instead, with a rate of
adherence considered to be inadequate by external reviewers?
Between the “declared policy aspirations” at the root of the
model for action and the results obtained, the overlapping is
not complete. What are the factors that contributed to this gap?
We will mention two of them which are linked to the design of
the device as well as to its implementation.
4.4.1 Poorly adapted incentive
In order for a company to improve the nutritional quality of
its products, the result should be acceptable from the economic
point of view. This acceptability can also be the result of
indirect effects that a company expects, for example, its
integration, through its nutritional improvements, into a
sustainable development approach or one of corporate social
responsibility, etc. Sanctions or the threat of the establishment
of another more limiting policy instrument can also encourage
ﬁrms to undertake voluntary approaches (David, 2004).
Sanctions are absent in the charter device and if the threat
of the application of another instrument exists, it is not
explicitly laid out and is therefore not totally credible
(Segerson and Miceli, 1998; Krarup, 2001).
By giving the possibility of making their commitment
public, the government hoped to incite the EOs to improve
their standard offer and to reward them for their efforts,
considering that if nothing was offered in exchange, they
would have no reason to join the device. In fact, some ﬁrmsPage 11explained their refusal to make their commitment public in
terms of strategy and the image of their products (consumers
could then say: “so, your products were not up to nutritional
standards before?”)16. Several ﬁrms found that the commit-
ment was more interesting in relation to legitimizing in-house
approaches in progress or to be undertaken, rather than in
relation to consumers. Also, the incentive offered by the
government seems to be poorly adapted to counteracting the
commercial risks incurred by product change. Moreover, this
mention may contribute to the consumer’s confusion. On the
one hand, it is independent of the level of effort involved. On
the other hand, as a result of the halo effect (Thorndike, 1920),
the consumer can interpret it as a guarantee of good nutritional
quality intrinsic to the product and not as a signal of
participation in a quality improvement approach. For the same
reason, the validation committee experts hesitated to validate a
charter in some cases, forgetting “that only nutritional
improvement is welcome by the charter, even if it involves
products previously considered as ʻfatty, salty or sweet’”
(Jourdain-Menninger et al., 2010). These cases concern foods
that, despite the improvements proposed, will always remain
too rich in those nutrients whose consumption would be
desirable to reduce.
The incentive, in the broadest sense (mentions, sanctions,
threats, etc.), must be adapted to the speciﬁc situation in which
the agreement device will be established and to the aims that
underlie these agreements. Also it must be ﬂexible enough to
be able to evolve according to changes in global offer quality
and in the behavior of offer and demand actors, in particular of
signatory ﬁrms.
4.4.2 Shortage of collective approaches
Few agreements were signed after completion of the work
of the thematic groups, and among the small number of
collective applications submitted, there were a number of
proposals that were not followed up. It should however be
mentioned that these groups constitute the only action intended
to promote collective commitments within the device. This is
probably due to the fact that the collective agreements were
introduced into the texts at the request of the Ministry of
Agriculture, whereas the Ministry of Health had only provided
for individual agreements. In fact, the Ministry of Health,
responsible for the implementation of the charter device,
counts on emulation and competition. It considers that it is the
individual agreements that will make it possible to go further in
terms of nutritional improvement. Its position is that signing
only collective agreements would mean relinquishing part of
the effort that could have been made by some ﬁrms within the
collective. It considers that the ﬁrm that determines the level of
collective effort is the one that will make the smallest
contribution to improvement. The limit of this reasoning can
be found in the organoleptic constraints that can hinder the
most ambitious individual approaches, even if they are
progressive. When changes in nutritional composition are
collective, the risk of an eventual decrease in the interest of
consumers for non-improved products is lowered since
modiﬁcations are more generalized and their progressivityde 15
Fig. 2. Possible trajectories for the improvement of the nutritional
offer through voluntary commitments. 1. Small number of commit-
ments with low nutritional quality. 2. Small number of commitments
with high nutritional quality. 3. Large number of commitments with
high nutritional quality. 4. Large number of commitments with low
nutritional quality. 5. Part of the offer that does not necessarily need to
be modiﬁed (traditional recipes, festive foods, etc.).
17Usage code or code of practice is a non-binding document offering
a general framework for recommendations whose purpose is the
adoption of uniform measures by the sector to which it is addressed. It
contains general recommendations concerning practices and opera-
tions that must be implemented in the aim of reaching ﬁxed objectives
(Deﬁnition of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations).
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charters could also be due to the fact that ﬁrms do not really
need to work together to ﬁnd solutions to the technical
challenges facing them in terms of the improvement of the
nutritional quality of their products. They would not be in a
situation of shared radical uncertainties (Aggeri et al., 1995)
where the synergy of efforts would make it possible to end a
deadlock and make better and faster progress. Firms seem to
have the means to advance independently in the area of
nutrition, and this is even more evident when the diversity of
the processes responsible for similar products can be a factor
that limits the interest for common and generalized solutions.
Moreover, for those ﬁrms capable of improving their products,
the individual agreement is a means of promoting a
competitive asset while maintaining a trade secret. Finally,
collective agreements are more difﬁcult to establish than
individual agreements because it is necessary to mobilize and
coordinate several different entities. If we add the limited
efforts intended to promote collective agreements, the absence
of a speciﬁc guide for collective charters as well as the high
level of requirement in relation to the commitments, we can
perhaps explain the predominance of individual agreements.
This situation raises an essential question: should the
government target small, generalized improvement or should
it set its stakes on a bigger improvement that only affects a
small part of the offer, hoping that, as a result of emulation, the
rest of the offer will follow?
4.5 Charter dilemma: privilege requirement level or
adhesion level?
Modiﬁcation of the quality of the offer by voluntary
nutritional improvement commitments concerns two key
dimensions: (1) the quality intrinsic to the commitments; and
(2) the share of the global offer covered by signed
commitment charters. This latter dimension can be assimi-
lated to the number of agreements signed, even if it may vary
depending on the competition structure of the sector and on
the individual or collective character of the charter.
Interactions between these two dimensions can be illustrated
by a diagram with four main quadrants (Fig. 2). They
represent as many situations as possible in the commitment
process and make it possible to trace the different
improvement trajectories of the offer. Section 5 of the
diagram represents the part of the offer that is not necessary to
modify because it corresponds, for example, to traditional
recipes or to festive foods. Taking quadrant 2 as a departure
point, the aim of the French charter device is to progressively
shift to quadrant 3, i.e., to obtain a large number of
commitments, collective or individual, of high nutritional
quality. A constant of this trajectory is the high level of
requirements in terms of nutrition, as well as for the
preparation of the application. This last aspect, far from being
negligible, turned out to be an impediment for the submission
of applications.
An alternative trajectory (Fig. 2) would have been to target
a gradual increase in commitments that were less ambitious in
terms of quality in order to obtain a large volume of the offer
related to nutritional improvements, even of a limited scope
(shift from 1 to 4). The second stage of this trajectory would
have been the gradual increase of the quality of commitmentsPage 12on the part of the EOs, shifting from 4 to 3 or remaining in an
intermediate shared position between quadrants 4 and 2 if
some of the EOs did not improve the quality of their
commitments above a certain level. We could have hoped for
this type of trajectory if the signature of the collective charters
had been presented to the EOs as a condition for signing more
demanding individual charters with a speciﬁc mention at a later
date. We believe that it is possible that the leading ﬁrms could
act as a driving force so that their sector could collectively
reach a minimum level of improved nutritional quality and sign
a collective charter. These leaders would be guided by two
motivations. On the one hand, they would want to differentiate
themselves by signing more demanding individual charters. In
this case, the question still remains as to which incentive
should be offered to allow the leaders to distinguish
themselves. On the other hand, they would try to avoid any
possible negative fallout on the sector’s image incurred by the
delay in terms of nutritional quality. This ripple effect
propagated by the leading ﬁrms through professional
organizations could also come about through the modiﬁcation
of the “usage code”17 or the creation of an MQS (Minimum
Quality Standard). Improvement would then be generalized
and perpetuated. It is possible that at the end of this process, the
number of potential candidates for the signature of more
demanding individual charters would increase since some
EOs, initiated despite themselves to the nutritional improve-
ment approach, would perhaps discover a strategic interest.
This reasoning nevertheless remains hypothetical.
Reasoning in terms of a trajectory leads to the question of
the presence of elements that could act as positive ripple
factors of these VAs based on emulation. To illustrate that, we
will mention one of them, which can be double-edged inde 15
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can be found among the elements that may act as positive
ripple factors, particularly in relation to exemplary actions. For
example, in the Bleu-Blanc-Cœur charter, the commitment of
this association focuses particularly on the breakdown of what
it has already accomplished. Should retroactivity be conside-
red as a windfall effect or as a fair public recognition for an
effort already made which in turn could be an inspiration to
other ﬁrms?
This discussion casts light on the difﬁculties of the public
authorities to identify clear signals to be sent to EOs to create
positive dynamics within adhesion trajectories.
5 Conclusions
The gap observed between the projected policy action
model and the implemented program conﬁrms the interest in
studying public policies through actions and instruments and
not only through projects and announced goals (Lascoumes
and Le Galès, 2004; Aggeri and Labatut, 2010).
Our work shows that the instrumental food policy
innovation, represented by the charters, must be accompanied
by an innovation in the evaluation methods. Evaluating
voluntary agreements without taking into account their speciﬁc
characteristics, the “nature of the problem” (Aggeri, 1999) and
the dynamic and interactive perspective of the policy process,
does not make it possible to measure their impacts on the
whole food system and consequently diminishes the possibi-
lities of making operational feedback.
Our analysis indicates that a VA must not just be
considered as an objective in itself but as a contribution to
the improvement of the quality of the global offer. As a result,
such a device must be thought out in terms of a trajectory, by
strategically mobilizing the different resources available.
According to the dynamics of this trajectory, we can be led to
momentarily favor the volume of the improved offer rather
than the quality of the signed commitments (within acceptable
limits), giving priority to quality at another stage. The same is
true for the choice between the use of individual and/or
collective agreements and the most effectively adapted
sequence to mobilize them.
The French device appears to be original and rigorous in
relation to several points analyzed. In the absence of
experiences that could provide reference points which we
could refer to, as well as measurable objectives established
beforehand, the reference point used to judge the success or
failure of the device is the expectations that it generated. These
expectations were not fulﬁlled for many of the actors involved.
While taking the speciﬁc time frame of this type of instrument
into account, we consider that the urgency of health problems
linked to diet forces us to reﬂect on the optimization of the
adhesion rate and, particularly, on the increase of collective
commitments.
Funding
This research did not receive any speciﬁc grant from the
commercial or not-for-proﬁt sectors.Page 13Conﬂicts of interest. The author declares that she has no
conﬂicts of interest in relation to this article.
Références
Aggeri F. 1998. Environnement et pilotage de l’innovation : un
modèle dynamique du développement durable. Le cas du
recyclage automobile. École Nationale Supérieure des Mines
de Paris, p. 390.
Aggeri F. 1999. Environmental policies and innovation: A
knowledge-based perspective on approaches. Res Policy 28:
699–717.
Aggeri F, Labatut J. 2010. La gestion au prisme de ses instruments.
Une analyse généalogique des approches théoriques fondées sur
les instruments de gestion. Finance Contrôle Stratégie 13: 5–37.
Aggeri F, Lefebvre P, Hatchuel A. 1995. La naissance de la voiture
recyclable : intervention de l’État et apprentissages collectifs.
Cahiers de Recherche du Centre Scientiﬁque de Gestion, 80 p.
Allard-Poesi F. 2011. Le codage n’est pas un « truc » méthodologique
ou du codage comme « problématisation ». Le Libellio d’Aegis 7:
3–8.
Ayache M, Dumez H. 2011. Le codage dans la recherche qualitative
une nouvelle perspective ? Le Libellio d’Aegis 7: 33–46.
Barde J-P. 1992. Économie et politique de l’environnement. Paris :
Presses universitaires de France.
Basdevant A, Bas-Théron F, Combris P, et al. 2006. Obésité : bilan et
évaluation des programmes de prévention et de prise en charge.
Paris : INSERM Éditions.
Brownell KD, Horgen KB. 2004. Food ﬁght: The inside story of the
food industry, America’s obesity crisis, and what we can do about
it. Chicago: Contemporary Books.
Brownell KD, Kersh R, Ludwig DS, et al. 2010. Personal
responsibility and obesity: A constructive approach to a
controversial issue. Health Affair 29: 379–387.
Coglianese C. 2001. Is consensus an appropriate basis for regulatory
policy?. In: Orts E, Deketelaere K, eds. Environmental contracts:
Comparative approaches to regulatory innovation in the United
States and Europe. Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International.
Combris P, Goglia R, Henini M, Soler LG, Spiteri M. 2011.
Improvement of the nutritional quality of foods as a public health
tool. Public Health 125: 717–724.
David M. 2004. Les approches volontaires comme instrument de
régulation environnementale. Revue Française d’Economie 19:
227–273.
EC. 1996. Communication from the Commission to the Council and
the European Parliament on environmental agreements, COM 96
561. Final, November 27 European Environmental Agency,
1997.
EC. 2002. Environmental Agreements at Community Level Within
the Framework of the Action Plan on the Simpliﬁcation and
Improvement of the Regulatory Environment. Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the Economic an Social Committéé and the Committee of the
Regions. Brussels, 17.7.2002 COM(2002) 412 ﬁnal.
Eckel RH, Borra S, Lichtenstein AH, Yin-Piazza SY. 2007.
Understanding the complexity of trans fatty acid reduction in
the American diet. Circulation 115: 2231–2246.
Forgues B, Vandangeon-Derumez I. 2007. Analyses longitudinales.
In: Thiétart R-A, ed. Méthodes de recherche en management.
Paris : Dunod, pp. 439–465.
Foucault M. 1977. Le jeu de Michel Foucault (entretien). In: Foucault
M, ed. Dits et écrits III. Paris : Gallimard.de 15
C. Sebillotte : OCL 2019, 26, 34Girgis S, Neal B, Prescott J, et al. 2003. A one-quarter reduction in the
salt content of bread can be made without detection. Eur J Clin
Nutri 57: 616–620.
Glachant M. 1995. Les accords volontaires dans la politique
environnementale : une mise en perspective de leur nature et
de leur efﬁcacité. In : Economie & Prévision, Agriculture et
environnement 117–118: 49–59. doi: 10.3406/ecop.1995.5713.
Golan E, Unnevehr L. 2008. Food product composition, consumer
health, and public policy: Introduction and overview of special
section. Food Policy 33: 465–469.
Grolleau G, Mzoughi N, Thiébaut L. 2004. Les instruments
volontaires : un nouveau mode de régulation de l’environnement ?
Revue internationale de droit économique 18: 461–481.
Harris JL, Pomeranz JL, Lobstein T, Brownell KD. 2009. A crisis in
the marketplace: How food marketing contributes to childhood
obesity and what can be done. Annu Rev Public Health 30:
211–225.
Hatchuel A. 1994. Apprentissages collectifs et activités de concep-
tion. Revue Française de Gestion: 109–120.
Hawkes C. 2007. Regulating food marketing to young people
worldwide: Trends and policy drivers. Am J Public Health 97:
1962–1973.
Hercberg S, Tallec A. 2000. Pour une politique nutritionnelle de santé
publique en France. Paris : La Documentation Française, Haut
comité de la santé publique.
Hercberg S, Chat-Yung S, Chauliac M. 2008. The French National
Nutrition and Health Program: 2001-2006-2010. Int J Public
Health 53: 68–77.
Hervé-Fournereau N. 2008. Les approches volontaires et le droit de
l’environnement. Presses Universitaires de Rennes, p. 326.
Highley CJ, Convey F, Leveque F. 2001. Voluntary Approach: An
introduction. In: Highley CJ, Leveque F, eds. Concerted action on
voluntary approaches. International Policy Workshop on the Use
of Voluntary Approach (CAVA). Bruxelles: Centre d’économie
industrielle École Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris
(CERNA), pp. 1–4.
Jourdain-Menninger D, Lignot-Leloup M. 2003. Comparaisons
internationales sur la prévention sanitaire. Paris : Inspection
Général des Affaires Sociales.
Jourdain-Menninger D, Lecoq G, Guedj J, Boutet P, Danel J-B,
Mathieu G. 2010. Évaluation du programme national nutrition
santé PNNS2 2006-2010. Paris : La Documentation Française,
Inspection Générale des Affaires Sociales, Conseil général de
l’alimentation, de l’agriculture et des espaces ruraux.
Kersh R. 2009. The politics of obesity: A current assessment and look
ahead. Milbank Q 87: 295–316.
Kersh R, Morone J. 2002. The politics of obesity: Seven steps to
government action. Health Affair 21: 142–153.
Kersh R, Morone JA. 2005. Obesity, courts, and the new politics of
public health. J Health Polit Polic 30: 839–868.
Krarup S. 2001. Can voluntary approaches be environmentally
effective and economically efﬁcient?. In: Higley CJ, Lévêque F,
eds. Environmental voluntary approaches: Research insights for
policy-makers. Paris : CERNA, pp. 52–64.
Kvale S, Brinkmann S. 2009. Interviews. Learning the craft of
qualitative research interviewing, 2 ed. Los Angeles – London –
New Delhi – Singapour: SAGE.
L’Abbe MR, Stender S, Skeaff CM, Ghafoorunissa Tavella M. 2009.
Approaches to removing trans fats from the food supply in
industrialized and developing countries. Eur J Clin Nutr 63:
S50–S67.
Lang T. 2006. Food, the law and public health: Three models of the
relationship. Public Health 120: 30–40.Page 14Lascoumes P. 1994. L’éco-pouvoir. Environnements et politiques.
Paris : La Découverte.
Lascoumes P, Le Galès P. 2004. Gouverner par les instruments. Paris :
Presses de la Fondation Nationale de Science Politique.
Lascoumes P, Benghozi M, Robert F. 1989. Négocier le droit de
l’environnement ? : le volet discret d’une politique publique :
contrats et programmes de branches, programmes d’entreprises.
Première partie, Les négociations et leurs contextes. Politiques et
Management Publique 11: 47–83.
Ludwig DS, Nestle M. 2008. Can the food industry play a
constructive role in the obesity epidemic? J Am Med Assoc
300: 1808.
Mancino L, Kuchler F, Leibtag E. 2008. Getting consumers to eat
more whole-grains: The role of policy, information, and food
manufacturers. Food Policy 33: 489–496.
Menard C, Dumas C, Goglia R, et al. 2011. Oqali: A French database
on processed foods. J Food Compos Anal 24, 744–749.
MS, MES. 2012. Les chartes d’engagements de progrès nutritionnels.
Ministère de l’emploi et de la solidarité-Ministère délégué à la
santé, DGS/Sous-direction EA, Prévention des risques liés à
l’environnement et à l’alimentation.
Mzoughi N. 2005. Analyse économique des approches volontaires de
régulation de l’environnement. Dijon : Université de Bourgogne,
p. 234.
Nestle M. 2002. Food politics: How the food industry inﬂuences
nutrition and health. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Nijman CAJ, Zijp IM, Sierksma A, et al. 2006. A method to improve
the nutritional quality of foods and beverages based on dietary
recommendations. Eur J Clin Nutr 61: 461–471.
Oqali. 2012. Évaluation de l’impact potentiel des chartes d’engage-
ments volontaires de progrès nutritionnel sur les apports en
nutriments de la population française. Oqali, p. 147.
Oqali. 2013. Étude d’impact des chartes d’engagements volontaires
de progrès nutritionnel sur les volumes de nutriments mis sur le
marché. Étude actualisée, Édition 2013. Oqali, p. 66.
Pettigrew AM. 1990. Longitudinal ﬁeld research on change: Theory
and practice. Organ Sci 1: 267–292.
Pomeranz JL, Brownell KD. 2008. Legal and public health
considerations affecting the success, reach, and impact of
menu-labeling laws. Am J Public Health 98: 1578–1583.
Pomeranz JL, Teret SP, Sugarman SD, Rutkow L, Brownell KD.
2009. Innovative legal approaches to address obesity. Milbank Q
87: 185–213.
Ratnayake WMN, L’Abbe MR, Farnworth S, et al. 2009. Trans fatty
acids: Current contents in Canadian foods and estimated intake
levels for the Canadian population. J AOAC Int 92: 1258–1276.
Ricciuto L, Lin K, Tarasuk V. 2009. A comparison of the fat
composition and prices of margarines between 2002 and 2006,
when new Canadian labelling regulations came into effect. Public
Health Nutr 12: 1270–1275.
Romelaer P. 2005. L’entretien de recherche. In: Roussel P,Wacheux F,
eds. Management des ressources humaines. Méthodes de
recherche en sciences humaines et sociales. Bruxelles : De
Boeck, pp. 101–137.
Rossman GB, Rallis SF. 1998. Learning in the ﬁeld: An introduction
to qualitative research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Saunders D, Jones S, Devane GJ, Scholes P, Lake RJ, Paulin SM.
2008. Trans fatty acids in the New Zealand food supply. J Food
Compos Anal 21: 320–325.
Sebillotte C. 2016. Nutrition et bien commun. La construction d’un
nouveau modèle d’action publique. Thèse de doctorat de
l’Université de recherche Paris Sciences et Lettres PSL Research
University préparée à Mines ParisTech, p. 547.de 15
C. Sebillotte : OCL 2019, 26, 34Sebillotte M, Sebillotte C. 2002. Recherche ﬁnalisée, organisations et
prospective. La méthode prospective SYSPAHMM (Système,
Processus, Agrégats d’Hypothèses, Micro et Macroscénarios).
OCL 9(5): 329–345.
Sebillotte M, Sebillotte C. 2010. Foresight in mission-oriented
research: The SYSPAHMM foresight method (SYStem, Pro-
cesses, Clusters of Hypotheses, Micro-and Macroscenarios).
Futures 42: 15–25.
Segerson K, Miceli TJ. 1998. Voluntary environmental agreements:
Good or bad news for environmental protection? J Environ Econ
Manag 36: 109–130.
Seiders K, Petty RD. 2004. Obesity and the role of food marketing: A
policy analysis of issues and remedies. J Public Policy Mark 23:
153–169.
Sharma LL, Teret SP, Brownell KD. 2010. The food industry and self-
regulation: Standards to promote success and to avoid public
health failures. Am J Public Health 100: 240–246.
Stanley F, Daube M. 2009. Should industry care for children? Public
health advocacy and law in Australia. Public Health 123: 283–286.
Swinburn B, Egger G, Raza F. 1999. Dissecting obesogenic
environments: The development and application of a framework
for identifying and prioritizing environmental interventions for
obesity. Prev Med 29: 563–570.
Thomson BM. 2009. Nutritional modelling: Distributions of salt intake
from processed foods in New Zealand. Br J Nutr 102: 757–767.
Thorndike EL. 1920. A constant error in psychological ratings. J Appl
Psychol 41: 25–29.
Unnevehr LJ, Jagmanaite E. 2008. Getting rid of trans fats in the US
diet: Policies, incentives and progress. Food Policy 33: 497–503.
Wilde P. 2009. Self-regulation and the response to concerns about
food and beveragemarketing to children in the United States.Nutr
Rev 67: 155–166.Page 15Yach D, Khan M, Bradley D, Hargrove R, Kehoe S, Mensah G. 2010.
The role and challenges of the food industry in addressing chronic
disease. Global Health 6(1): 10.
Web references
Casino. 2008. Groupe Casino, Charte d’engagements volontaires de
progrès nutritionnel dans le cadre du programme national
nutrition santé II. http://solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/
casino.pdf (accessed 23.11.2017).
MAAP. 2011. Le Programme National pour l’Alimentation (PNA).
Ministère de l’agriculture, de l’alimentation, de la pêche, de la
ruralité et de l’aménagement du territoire, 75 p. http://agriculture.
gouv.fr/sites/minagri/ﬁles/documents/pdf/PNA-09022011.pdf.
MAAP, MINEFI, MS, 2007. Référentiel type pour les chartes
d’engagements volontaires de progrès nutritionnel proposées par
les exploitants du secteur alimentaire dans le cadre du programme
national nutrition santé 2.Ministères en charge de l’agriculture, de
la consommation et de la santé, Paris, 13 p. http://agriculture.
gouv.fr/telecharger/44202?token=24726a77588a2d7564a9e3055
d8e9df0 (accessed 23.11.2017).
MS. 2006. Deuxième Programme National Nutrition-Santé PNNS
2006–2010, Actions et mesures. Ministère de l’emploi et de la
solidarité-Ministère délégué à la santé, p. 51. https://www.irbms.
com/download/documents/programme-national-nutrition-sante-
pnns-2006-2010.pdf (accessed 23.11.2017).
MS. 2017. Les signataires des chartes d’engagements de progrès
nutritionnels. Ministère des solidarités et de la Santé. http://
solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/prevention-en-sante/preserver-sa-
sante/le-programme-national-nutrition-sante/article/les-signatai
res-des-chartes-d-engagements-de-progres-nutritionnels (acces-
sed 23.11.2017).Citation de l’article : Sebillotte C. 2019. Efﬁciency of public-private co-regulation in the food sector: the French voluntary agreements for
nutritional improvements. OCL 26: 34.de 15
